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Abstract. With equitable key escrow the control of society over the in-

dividual and the control of the individual over society are shared fairly.
In particular, the control is limited to speci ed time periods. We consider two applications: time controlled key escrow and time controlled
auctions with closed bids. In the rst the individual cannot be targeted
outside the period authorized by the court. In the second the individual
cannot withhold his closed bid beyond the bidding period. We propose
two protocols, one for each application. We do not require the use of
temper-proof devices.
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1 Introduction
Key escrow has been proposed as a mechanism to protect society from individuals who use a communication system for criminal purposes [4, 24, 10] (an excellent survey of key escrow systems is given by D.E. Denning and D.K. Branstad
in [11]). However key escrow can also be used to target innocent individuals. This
potential targeting is a major factor which contributes to the social unacceptability of key escrow. >From the point of view of an individual, key escrow may
restrict his/her privacy and give controlling power to society (Big Brother [8]),
which may, in certain circumstances, abuse it. In a society oriented key escrow
this power must be equally shared between the individual and society (for an
analysis of fair cryptosystems see [24, 22]). Furthermore it must have a limited
life span. Indeed a major objection to currently proposed key escrow schemes
is that there is no e ective time control. Once an order to recover a key by
the escrow agents has been given, there is nothing to prevent the agents from

abusing their power and decrypting all wire-tapped messages, far beyond the
time speci ed by the Court order. Various scenarios can be envisaged in which
a threat against a minority is indeed serious. While the Bellare{Goldwasser[3]
scheme protects a majority against Big Brother, it does not protect a minority.
For example, an extremist group aiming to take control of the government can
wire-tap all communication of suspect dissidents, which would then be decrypted
when the group took over control.
It is essential that the control of the escrow agents be limited to speci ed
time periods, beyond which it should not be possible for the agents to recover
the \old" private keys of a targeted individual. For this purpose we have chosen
in our rst application of equitable key escrow, to update the keys at regular
intervals, and to make it infeasible to compute old keys from the new key. The
escrow agents must destroy all the shares of the old keys with each updating.
We can allow for a small number of corrupted agents who keep their old shares,
but these should not be sucient to reconstruct the keys.
Our second application of equitable key escrow is contract bidding. In this
case it is the individual who may try to abuse society. To prevent a tender
from being opened before the speci ed date, it is encrypted with an escrowed
key. The bidder must have some control over the encryption otherwise one can
envisage situations in which the escrow agents may collude with a corrupted
receiving agent. This threat can be eliminated if the bidder pre-encrypts the bid
with his/her own key. However the bidder may then withhold the key. There
are several scenarios in which such a threat may be of concern. For example, if
altered circumstances make the bid unpro table, or loss making. In this case,
it is \society" (the receiving oce) which is threatened by the individual (the
bidder). The solution we propose is to force the bidder to use a weak encryption
key (a nice discussion on the use of weak keys is given in [28]). This imposes a
time limit which should make it possible for the agents to recover the bid after
the tender is opened. Two keys are used: a key for the bidder and an escrowed
key. The pair of these keys can be regarded as an enlarged escrow key, in which
the share of the bidder is her/his key while the shares of the agents are their old
shares. In this way the bidder is included in all authorized sets.
Our goal in this paper is to design protocols which achieve equitable key
escrow. For this purpose we combine the threshold scheme of Boyd [7], the ElGamal threshold scheme of Desmedt{Frankel [14] and add time dependency. The
organization of this paper has as follows. In Section 2 we present our rst protocol for a time controlled key escrow system and discuss its security. In Section 3
we present a protocol for time controlled auctions with closed bids.

Notation and Background
Let p be a prime and g 2 Zp an element of large order. All operations in Zp
are performed modulo p. For simplicity, and when there is no ambiguity, we
drop the operator \modp". We also write x 2R X to indicate that the element

x is selected uniformly at random from the set X, independently of all other
selections.
The Die-Hellman [16] operator DH is de ned by DH(gx ; gy ) = gxy . The
problem of nding DH(gx; gy ), given gx ; gy , is believed to be hard, and is called
the Die-Hellman problem. If gx ; gy and z 2 Zp are given, then the problem of
deciding whether z = DH(gx; gy ) is called the Die-Hellman decision problem. If
this problem is hard then so is the Die-Hellman problem. The symmetric DieHellman problem (called the squaring DH-oracle in [23]) is the problem of nding
DH(gx; gx ) given gx . This problem is as hard as the Die-Hellman problem under
some reasonable conditions [23, Theorem 2]. The problem of deciding whether
z = DH(gx; gx ), given z; gx is the symmetric Die-Hellman decision problem. If
this problem is hard then so are the Die-Hellman problem, the Die-Hellman
decision problem and the symmetric Die-Hellman decision problem. We will
also consider the problem of nding elements with large order in Zp . This is
related to Problem C19 in the Adleman{McCurley list of open problems in
Number Theoretic Complexity [1], and is considered to be hard.

2 Time controlled key escrow
For simplicity we focus on a basic `-out-of-` escrow system. We will discuss
generalizations to other access structures later on.
Our system uses a Discrete Logarithm setting with prime modulus p and
g 2 Zp an appropriate element of large order. Initially, at time t = 0, the private
key of the receiver, Bob, is a 2R Zp 1 and the public key is y0 = ga mod p. Bob
shares his private key among ` escrow agents EAi, i = 1; 2; : : :; `.
In our basic model each agent gets a share si 2R Zp 1 (i = 1; 2; : : :; ` 1),
and s` is such that s1  s2    s` = a mod (p 1). The main feature of our system
is that the private key of Bob and its shares are updated at regular intervals
without the need for interaction. At time t, the private key of Bob is updated
to a2 mod (p 1), the shares are updated to si 2 mod (p 1), and the public
key is updated to yt = ga2 mod p. The agents EAi compute the new shares by
themselves, and must destroy the old shares. As a consequence, the escrow agents
cannot decrypt a ciphertext which was encrypted with an old key at a later date,
even if forced. We shall prove that the problem of decrypting encryptions with
earlier keys is related to two problems: the problem of nding elements of large
order in Zp and the symmetric Die-Hellman decision problem. Both problems
are believed to be hard (cf. [1, 23]).
We rst describe our basic protocol in more detail. This combines ideas
from [6, 7, 14, 26].
t

t

t

Setting
The parties involved: the sender Alice, the receiver Bob, a Court, the Law
Enforcement Agency LEA, and the Escrow Agents EAi , i = 1; 2; : : :; `.
The parameters: A Discrete Logarithm setting is used. Bob chooses a prime p
such that p 1 has two large prime factors p1; p2, with p1  p2  3 (mod 4), so

( 1 j p1 ) = ( 1 j p2) = 1 (p1p2 is a Blum integer [6]), and an element g 2 Zp
whose order is p1 p2. Bob gives p; g to all the agents EAi , i = 1; 2; : : :; `, and to
Alice.
Bob has a long term public key which is known to all parties concerned. This key
is used for authenticating (signing) Bob's encryption keys and the parameters
p; g, if required.

Set-up

Set time := 0.
Bob chooses his private key a 2R Zp 1 and nds ` shares si of it, i = 1; : : :; `, by
choosing si 2R Zp 1 for i = 1; : : :; ` 1, and taking s` = a(s1    s` 1 ) 1 mod(p 1).
The public key of Bob is y0 = ga . Bob publishes this key.
Then,
1. Bob gives privately to each agent EAi , i = 1; 2; : : :; `, the share si .
2. Bob publishes z1 := gs1 ; z2 := gs2 ; : : :; z` := gs , and each agent EAi checks
that these are correct, that is that zi = gs , where si is its share. If any check
fails then Bob has cheated and is reported to the LEA.
Bob publishes z1;2 := gs1 s2 ; z1;2;3 := gs1 s2 s3 ; : : :; z1;2;;` := gs1 s2 s (= y0 ),
and proves in zero-knowledge to the LEA that these are correctly constructed. That is, Bob proves that z1;2;:::;k = DH(z1;2;:::;k 1; zk ), for k =
2; : : :; `, by using an interactive zero-knowledge proof for the Die-Hellman
problem { an example of such a proof is given in Appendix A. If any of the
proofs fails, then Bob has cheated and is reported to the LEA.
`

i

`

The protocol
Updating

At time = t
Each agent EAi updates his share by squaring it, i.e., the current share is
si 2 mod (p 1), and then destroys the old share (si 2 1 mod (p 1)).
Bob updates his private key to a2 mod (p 1) and publishes his public key
yt := ga2 mod p. If necessary Bob proves to the LEA that this is correct by
using an interactive zero-knowledge proof for the Die-Hellman problem (for
example, the interactive proof given in Appendix A). That is, Bob proves that
yt = DH(yt 1; yt 1).
t
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Getting an escrowed key
1. Alice asks Bob for a new encryption key.
2. Bob sends Alice his public key which is authenticated with his long term
key, (p; g; yt; signBob (p; g; yt )).
3. If Bob's signature is valid then Alice sends Bob the encryption ElG(m) =
(gr ; myt r ), r 2R Zp 1 , of a message m 2 Zp with key yt .

4. If the Court has issued an order to recover the message, then the LEA
will wire-tap the communication and send gr to agent EA1. The agents
EA1; EA2 ; : : :; EA` Q
then1 compute yt r sequentially
Q s2 as follows:
Q 1 s2fors2i < `, each
2
r
s
r
r
EAi on receiving g =1 computes g =1 Q := (g =1 ) , which it
1 2
sends to EAi+1 . Agent EA` then computes (gr =1 s )s2 , which it sends to
the LEA. Since this corresponds to yt r , the LEA can decrypt the ciphertext.
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Security
Theorem1. (Irreversible time) If the symmetric Die-Hellman decision
problem is hard and if nding elements of large order in Zp is hard, then decrypting old ciphertext with new shares of the escrow agents is hard.
1 the shares of the escrow agents are si2 1 and
the secret key of Bob is a2 . At time t the shares are updated to s2i , the old
shares are destroyed, and Bob's secret key is updated to a2 . Observe that a2 ,
for t > 1, has 4 square roots in Zp1 p2 of which only one is a quadratic residue,
because of our restrictions on the primes p1 ; p2. It follows that there is only one
primitive 2u {th root of a2 in Zp1 p2 , 0 < u  t, which is a quadratic residue.
We continue with the proof. Suppose that there is a polynomial time algorithm A which on input p; g; z1; z2 ; : : :; z` , z1;2 , z1;2;3, . . . , z1;2;:::;` , the shares
s21 ; s22 ; : : :; s2` , the old shares of (` 1) corrupted shareholders, Bob's long term
key, the certi cates (p; g; yi; signBob (p; g; yi)), i = 1; 2; : : :; `, and an old ciphertext (w1 ; w2), with w1 = gr , r 2 Zp 1 , w2 = mytr u , m 2 Zp , will output the
message m. Then A can be used to compute gra2 (= w2=m), since any of the
other 2u{th roots of a2 will not produce the correct message. We now will use
A to get an element in Zp of large order. First we prepare an input for A.
Find an appropriate long term key for Bob. Take b 2R Zp 1 and choose
s1 ; s2; : : :; s` 1 2R Zp 1 . Compute s := s1  s2    s` 1 , s` := b  (s) 1 , and the
public keys yt u = gb, yt u+1 = gb2, .. . , yt = gb2 . If t = u, we get ` shares si of
b and the public keys y0 = gb , y1 = gb2 , . .. , yt = gb2 . If t > u, take b0 2R Zp 1
and choose 1 ;  2; : : :; ` 1 2R Zp 1 . Compute  := 1  2    ` 1, z1 := g1 ,
z2 := g2 , . .. , z` 1 := g 1 , z` := gb0 = , z11;2 := g1 2 , . .. , z1;2;:::;` := gb0 ,
. Observe that even though it is
and y0 := gb0 , y1 := gb20 ,... , yt u 1 := gb20
highly unlikely that the public key yt u is properly constructed when t > u (that
is, it is highly unlikely that yt u = DH(yt u 1; yt u 1), or that g2 = gs2 ), it
is hard for A to recognize this, if the symmetric Die-Hellman decision problem
is hard.
Give as input to A: p; g; z1; z2; : : :; z` , z1;2; : : :; z1;2;:::;` , the shares s1 ; : : :; s` 1,
the public keys y0 = gb, y1 = gb2, . .. , yt = gb2 , Bob's long term key, together
with the certi cates (p; g; yi; signBob0 (p; g; yi)), i = 1; 2; : : :; `, and an \old" ciphertext (w1; w2) encrypted at time t u, with w1 = gr, r 2R Zp 1 , and
Proof. (Sketch) At time t
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w2 2R Zp . Algorithm A will output a message m such that z2 =m = grd , where
d is a 2u {th root of b2 which is a quadratic residue in Zp1 p2 . However b was
chosen at random in Zp 1 , so that with probability 3/4 we get that b mod p1 p2
is not a residue in Zp1 p2 . Then with probability one half, b d is either a multiple
of p1 or a multiple of p2 . This means that grd =grb = gr(d b) has order p1 or p2 .
Consequently A can nd an element in Zp of large order.
u

Theorem 2. (Privacy) A wire-tapper may try to decipher the ciphertext. This
is as hard as the Die-Hellman problem.

Proof. (Sketch) We show this by using the approach in [13]. Suppose that B is
a polynomial time algorithm which on input: p; g; z1; z2 ; : : :; z` , z1;2, z1;2;3, . .. ,
z1;2;:::;` , the certi cates (p; g; yi; signBob0 (p; g; yi)), i = 1; 2; : : :; `, and the ciphertext (w1; w2), w1 = gr ,w2 = myt r , will output m. Let p; g; yt; w1 be an instance
of the the Die-Hellman problem. Construct z1 ; z2; : : :; z` , z1;2; ; : : :; z1;2;:::` ,
y0 ; y1 ; : : :; yt 2 Zp , as in the previous case. Give this as input to B together
with (w1; w2), to get a \message" m such that w2 =m = DH(yt ; w1) (= ytr).
The rest can all be simulated because we have used zero-knowledge proofs.

2.1 Generalizations

Generalizing time controlled l-out-of-l key escrow systems to l0 -out-of-l systems,
is straightforward when using more complex secret sharing schemes over Zp 1 ().
Secret sharing schemes that could be used for this purpose can be found in [15,
12, 2, 5], when using techniques such as those described in [17, 13]. Robustness
can be achieved by using, for example [20, 19].
Other properties such as proactive secret sharing can also be achieved using [21, 18, 27].

3 Time controlled auctions with closed bids
We rst consider a basic (additive) `-out-of-` escrow system, using a simple
setting. Generalizations will be discussed later.
Our system uses a Discrete Logarithm setting with composite modulus n =
p1 p2, where p1; p2 are appropriate large primes. The bidder, Alice, chooses n and
g1 ; g2 2 Zn such that g1 has large order whereas g2 has a rather small prime order
q. Alice has two public keys for encryption: y1 = g1a1 mod n, y2 = g2a2 mod n,
where a1 2R Z(n) , a2 2R Zq . The private key a1 is shared among ` escrow
agents EAi , i = 1; 2; : : :; `. The other is not shared. For this system the public
key y2 is weak and must be used only once . This key must be such that it can
be recovered by an exhaustive search of the key space, but the time taken for
this search should not be too short.4
4

Since an exhaustive search is parallelizable, some kind of inherently sequential scheme
may be used, such as the time-lock puzzles proposed in [28]. Our protocol can easily
be adapted to allow for such schemes.

Alice \double" encrypts her contract bid m by using the keys y1 ; y2. Let
ElG2 (m) be the encryption. Alice sends this to the receiving agent Bob. At
completion she will reveal both secret keys a1; a2, from which Bob will get the
tendered bid m. If Alice refuses to reveal these keys, then Bob informs the escrow
agents who will enable a rst decryption. This will make it possible for Bob to
get an encryption ElG(m) of m with private key a2 . Bob then initiates a procedure to recover m, by exhaustively breaking this encryption. Bob can achieve
this because the second key is relatively weak. A similar argument applies if a
Court order is issued to the escrow agents to enable the decryption of ElG2(m).
The security issues of this protocol will be discussed in more detail later. We
rst describe the protocol more formally.

Setting
The parties involved: the bidder Alice, the receiving ocer Bob, a Court, the
Law Enforcement Agency LEA, and the Escrow Agents EAi , i = 1; 2; : : :; `.
The parameters: Both Alice and Bob have long term public keys which are

known to each other. These keys are used for authentication (signing).
A Discrete Logarithm setting is used with a composite modulus n. Alice chooses
n = p1p2 , a product of two large primes p1 ; p2, with p1 1 = 2qq1, p2 1 = 2qq2,
q1; q2 primes, and q a rather small prime (say 140 bits).
Alice chooses g1 2R Zn and g2 2 Zn such that ord(g2 mod p1 ) = ord(g2 mod
p2) = q. Here ord(g2 mod p1 ) is the order of g2 in Zp1 and ord(g2 mod p2) is the
order of g2 in Zp2 . Consequently g2 has order q in Zn .

Set-up

Alice chooses a1 2R Z(n) and a2 2R Zq . The public key of Alice is (n; q; g1; g2; y1; y2 ),
where y1 := g1a1 mod n, y2 := g2 a2 mod n.
Alice nds ` shares of a1, by choosing exponents si 2R Z(n) for i = 1; 2; : : :; ` 1,
and taking s` = a1 (s1 + s2 + : : : + s` 1 ) mod(n).
1. Alice gives privately to each agent EAi , i = 1; 2; : : :; `, the share si .
2. Alice publishes z1 := gs1 ; z2 := gs2 ; : : :; z` := gs . Each agent EAi checks
that zi = gs and reports failure to the LEA. The LEA checks that ga =
z1  z2    z` . If any of the checks of the EAi 's fails or if the LEA's check fails
then Alice has cheated, the tender is rejected, and appropriate actions are
taken.
`

i

Sending an encrypted contract bid
1. Alice sends Bob the pair of her public keys authenticated with her long term
key,
(n; q; g1; g2; y1; y2 ; signAlice(g1 ; g2; n; q; y1; y2 ));
and the encrypted bid ElG2 (m) = (g1r1 ; g2r2 ; my1r1y2r2 ); where m 2 Zn is the
bid and r1 ; r2 2R Zn.

2. If the parameters are in the appropriate elds, with q a small prime, if the
order of g2 is q, and if Alice's public keys are authenticated properly, then
Bob accepts the tender and sends Alice a receipt signBob (Alice; ElG2(m)).

Opening a tender

When the tender is due to be opened, Alice sends Bob the private keys a1 ; a2.
Bob checks these for correctness. If correct, ElG2(m) is decrypted to get the bid
m, which is validated.
If Alice refuses to send her keys, the LEA is informed and initiates a procedure
to recover m.

The Court recovers the bid

If the Court has issued an order to recover the bid, the LEA will wire-tap the
communication and send gr1 to the escrow agents who will compute y1r1 . From
this the LEA can get ElG(m) = (g2r2 ; my2 r2 ): The key for this ciphertext is weak,
so the LEA can recover m by brutal force. However, q has to be suciently large
to prevent a conspiracy, as explained further on.

Security
The security of this system relies on the diculty of factoring a number n = p1p2 ,
p1 ; p2 primes, when a particular number g 2 Zn is given, with a rather small
prime order q. It is important that both g mod p1 6= 1 and g mod p2 6= 1. Otherwise, if say g mod p1 = 1, then p1 is a factor of g 1 and it becomes easy to
factor n by taking the gcd (n; g 1). Observe that for g = n 1 we have q = 2,
but this trivial case is too small to be of any use for us.

Fair auction bidding

Alice may refuse to open her bid, on completion. Bob will inform the LEA and
the Court will authorize the escrow agents to decrypt the ciphertext. The escrow
agents will compute y1r1 from which the LEA will get ElG(m) = (g2r2 ; my2 r2 ):
The key for this ciphertext is weak, so the LEA can initiate a procedure to recover m by brutal force. (Note that q has to be suciently large, as we now
explain.)

Conspiracy

The agents may be corrupted by the bidding ocer Bob. They will recover
ElG(m) = (g2 r2 ; my2 r2 ); but if the key y2 is not too weak they will not be able
to recover the message in time. For this reason q cannot be too small.
Theorem 3. (Privacy) A wire-tapper may try to decipher the bid m. This is
as hard as breaking the Die-Hellman problem.

Proof. (Sketch) Suppose that A is a polynomial time algorithm which on input:

n; q; g1; g2; y1; y2, authenticated with Alice's long term key, z1 ; z2 ; : : :; z` , and

(g1r1 ; g2r2 ; my1 r1 y2 r2 ), will output m. Let n; g1; y1 ; g1r1 be an instance of the DieHellman problem as in [13]. Take s1 ; : : :; s` 1 2R Zn , and s = s1 + : : : + s` 1 .
Then let z1 = gs1 , . .. , z` 1 = gs 1 and z` = y1 g1 s. Find an appropriate long
term key for Alice. Finally take r2 2R Zq and compute g2r2 and y2 r2 .
Give as input to A: n; q; g1; g2; y1; y2 , authenticated with Alice's public key,
z1 ; : : :; z` , and (g1r1 ; g2r2 ; w),
 where w 2R Zn . Algorithm A will output m,
 such
that w=
 m = y1r1y2r2 , from which we get DH(y1 ; g1r1) = y1r1 .
`

Generalizations

Similar generalizations to those in Section 2.1 apply. (Although (n) is not public, techniques similar to those in [17, 13] will address this problem.)
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A A zero-knowledge proof for the Die-Hellman problem
The zero-knowledge proof for the Die-Hellman problem in [9] is not adequate
for our purpose, since it designed for the case when the group of the exponents
has prime order. In our case the group of exponents has composite order. The
following protocol will serve our purpose.

A zero-knowledge interactive proof for the Die-Hellman problem
Input: A prime p, g 2 Zp of large order, = ga mod p, = gb mod p, =

gab mod p.
Repeat independently t = log p times the following subroutine:

1. The Prover selects exponents x; y 2R Zp 1 and sends to the Veri er: x =
gx mod p, y = gy mod p, xy = gxy mod p, ay = gay mod p, and bx =
gbx mod p.
2. The Veri er sends the Prover a query bit e 2R f0; 1g.
3. If e = 0 the Prover sends x; y to the Veri er, and the Veri er checks that:
x = gx mod p, y = gy mod p, xy = gxy mod p, ay = y mod p, and
bx = x mod p.
If e = 1 the Prover sends a0 = a 0+ x mod (p 1), b0 =0 b + y mod (p 1) to
the0 0Veri er who checks that: ga   x (modp), gb   y (modp), and
ga b   ay  bx  xy (modp).
If any of the checks fails, the Veri er halts and rejects the proof.
The Veri er accepts the proof of the Prover if all t rounds have been completed
successfully.
Let L = f(p; ; ; ) j p prime; = ga mod p; = gb mod p; = gab mod pg:
Then,

Theorem4. The protocol above is a perfect zero-knowledge proof of membership
in L.

Proof. (Sketch)
Completeness: Obvious.
Soundness: If the Prover can answer the queries e = 0; 1 then there exist a; b; x; y

such that a0 = a + x mod (p 1), b0 = b + y mod
(p 1), with ay = y mod p,
0
0
bx = x mod p, xy = gxy mod p, and  ga b  ay1  bx1  xy1  gab (modp).
0; b0 2R Zp 1 , and let x = ga0= mod p,
Zero-knowledge:
Let
;
;
be
given.
Pick
a
y0 0= gb0 = mod p. Then solve b0   ay (modp), a0   bx (modp),
ga b   ay  bx  xy (modp), for the unknowns ay ; bx, xy , respectively.
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